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In this paper, we set up a game theoretical model in which an incumbent and an entrant choose
their respective R&D strategies to compete with each other. Our paper contributes to three ma-
jor debates regarding a ﬁrm’s R&D strategy; the incumbent’s and the entrant’s choice between a
radical R&D project and an incremental one, the incumbent’s decision of whether to pre-empt the
entrant, and the trade-off between product quality improvement and time-to-market. Our model
considers three decisions that both the entrant and the incumbent need to make: (1) the amount
of investment in the R&D project, (2) timing of new product introduction, and (3) the magnitude
of performance improvement. These three decisions completely deﬁne a ﬁrm’s R&D strategy.
As for the product performance improvement, the entrant has to decide whether to introduce an
incrementally improved product or a drastically improved one. With the incrementally improved
product, the entrant can enter the market earlier at a low R&D cost, but it will lag behind the
incumbent in product performance. On the other hand, with the drastically improved product, the
entrant may be able to leapfrog the incumbent in product performance, but the downside is that the
entry needs to be delayed or more investment in the R&D project is needed. The entrant’s strategy
is further affected by the incumbent’s potential reaction. The incumbent, anticipating the entrant’s
entry, can react by either improving its product incrementally or drastically. The incumbent can
even pre-empt the entrant’s entry by introducing its new product before the entry occurs. We ﬁnd
that, when trading off time-to-market against quality improvement, both the incumbent and the en-
trant should emphasize quality improvement over time-to-market. Speciﬁcally, the entrant should
enter the market with a drastically improved new product, even if it means that the entry has to be
delayed. The incumbent, anticipating the entrant’s move, should react by introducing a drastically
improved new product as well. Therefore, in the debate about the relative importance of time-to-
market and quality improvement, we side with the school of thoughts that emphasizes the latter.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that there is no need for the incumbent to pre-empt the entrant’s move, i.e.,
the incumbent should introduce its new product only after entry even if it is certain about entry at
the very beginning. This is different from Gilbert and Newbery’s (1982) ﬁnding that the incumbent
should pre-empt the entrant, and it is also different from Kamien and Schwartz (1972) who show
that the incumbent will delay its R&D indeﬁnitely in the face of competition. As for the incum-
bent’s and the entrant’s choices of either a radical innovation or an incremental one, our ﬁnding isconsistent with the conventional wisdom that the entrant should introduce a radically innovative
product (Day and Shoemaker 2000). However, our ﬁndings on the incumbent’s choice of R&D
project differ from any existing studies that advocate a cautious approach (e.g., Reinganum 1983).
In recent years, many leading companies in various industries have come to the same conclusion
and began to invest in more drastic R&D projects (see Chandy and Tellis 2000), as advocated by
our ﬁndings. Our ﬁndings are also different from other studies in that we have produced clear and
easy-to-understand ﬁndings. In contrast, many existing studies (e.g., Ali, Kalwani and Kovenock
1993; Cohen, Eliashberg, and Ho 1996; Bayus, Jain and Rao 1997) provide more nuanced but
also ambiguous results that depend on market conditions that are difﬁcult to empirically validate.
The intuition for our major ﬁnding that both the incumbent and the entrant should engage in rad-
ical R&D projects is relatively straightforward. Consider the entrant ﬁrst. If the entrant enters
the market with an incrementally improved product, such is not forceful enough to challenge the
incumbent’s dominant position; hence, it is a dominated strategy by a drastic R&D project. And,
knowing that the entrant’s product will be always drastically improved, the incumbent should react
likewise to protect its leadership position. The optimal entry time for the entrant and the reaction
time for the incumbent are determined according to the trade-off of R&D costs and ﬁrm proﬁts,
and in equilibrium, the incumbent will not pre-empt entry to minimize its R&D costs. We also
study the scenario where the incumbent does not anticipate the entry. In this case, in order to take
advantage of the incumbent’s delayed reaction, the entrant should accelerate its entry, but should
not change its product strategy, that is, is should still introduce a drastically improved new product.
Although being caught off guard by the entrant’s surprise entry, the incumbent should not react
hastily. Rather, it should proceed with the same pace in its R&D process as in the previous case
and introduce a drastically improved new product.
KEYWORDS:CompetitiveStrategy; NewProduct; IntroductionStrategy; Time-to-Market; Game
Theory. 
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R&D Competition Between an Incumbent and an Entrant: 
An Integrated Model of R&D Investment, Performance Improvement, and Time-to-Market 
Abstract 
In this paper, we set up a game theoretical model in which an incumbent and an entrant 
choose their respective R&D strategies to compete with each other.  Our paper contributes to 
three major debates regarding a firm’s R&D strategy: the incumbent’s and the entrant’s choice 
between a radical R&D project and an incremental one, the incumbent’s decision of whether to 
pre-empt the entrant, and the trade-off between product quality improvement and time-to-market.  
Our model considers three decisions that both the entrant and the incumbent need to make: (1) 
the amount of investment in the R&D project, (2) timing of new product introduction, and (3) the 
magnitude of performance improvement.  These three decisions completely define a firm’s R&D 
strategy.  As for the product performance improvement, the entrant has to decide whether to 
introduce an incrementally improved product or a drastically improved one.  With the 
incrementally improved product, the entrant can enter the market earlier at a low R&D cost, but 
it will lag behind the incumbent in product performance.  On the other hand, with the drastically 
improved product, the entrant may be able to leapfrog the incumbent in product performance, but 
the downside is that the entry needs to be delayed or more investment in the R&D project is 
needed.  The entrant’s strategy is further affected by the incumbent’s potential reaction.  The 
incumbent, anticipating the entrant’s entry, can react by either improve its product incrementally 
or drastically.  The incumbent can even pre-empt the entrant’s entry by introducing its new 
product before the entry occurs. 
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We find that, when trading off time-to-market against quality improvement, both the 
incumbent and the entrant should emphasize quality improvement over time-to-market.  
Specifically, the entrant should enter the market with a drastically improved new product, even if 
it means that the entry has to be delayed.  The incumbent, anticipating the entrant’s move, should 
react by introducing a drastically improved new product as well.  Therefore, in the debate about 
the relative importance of time-to-market and quality improvement, we side with the school of 
thoughts that emphasizes the latter.  Furthermore, we find that there is no need for the incumbent 
to pre-empt the entrant’s move, i.e., the incumbent should introduce its new product only after 
entry even if it is certain about entry at the very beginning.  This is different from Gilbert and 
Newbery’s (1982) finding that the incumbent should pre-empt the entrant, and it is also different 
from Kamien and Schwartz (1972) who show that the incumbent will delay its R&D indefinitely 
in the face of competition.  As for the incumbent’s and the entrant’s choices of either a radical 
innovation or an incremental one, our finding is consistent with the conventional wisdom that the 
entrant should introduce a radically innovative product (Day and Shoemaker 2000).  However, 
our findings on the incumbent’s choice of R&D project differ from many existing studies that 
advocate a cautious approach (e.g., Reinganum 1983).  In recent years, many leading companies 
in various industries have come to the same conclusion and began to invest in more drastic R&D 
projects (see Chandy and Tellis 2000), as advocated by our findings.  Our findings are also 
different from other studies in that we have produced clear and easy-to-understand findings.  In 
contrast, many existing studies (e.g., Ali, Kalwani and Kovenock 1993; Cohen, Eliashberg, and 
Ho 1996; Bayus, Jain and Rao 1997) provide more nuanced but also ambiguous results that 
depend on market conditions that are difficult to empirically validate.   
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The intuition for our major finding that both the incumbent and the entrant should engage 
in radical R&D projects is relatively straightforward.  Consider the entrant first.  If the entrant 
enters the market with an incrementally improved product, such an entry is not forceful enough 
to challenge the incumbent’s dominant position; hence, it is a dominated strategy by a drastic 
R&D project.  And knowing that the entrant’s product will be always drastically improved, the 
incumbent should react likewise to protect its leadership position.  The optimal entry time for the 
entrant and the reaction time for the incumbent are determined according to the trade-off of R&D 
costs and firm profits, and in equilibrium, the incumbent will not pre-empt entry to minimize its 
R&D costs.  We also study the scenario where the incumbent does not anticipate the entry.  In 
this case, in order to take advantage of the incumbent’s delayed reaction, the entrant should 
accelerate its entry but should not change its product strategy, that is, it should still introduce a 
drastically improved new product.  Although being caught off guard by the entrant’s surprise 
entry, the incumbent should not react hastily.  Rather, it should proceed with the same pace in its 
R&D process as in the previous case and introduce a drastically improved new product. 
Key Words: Competitive Strategy; New Product; Introduction Strategy; Time-to-Market; Game 
Theory. 
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1. Introduction 
The importance of new products has long been recognized by researchers and 
practitioners alike.  Hence, a firm’s R&D strategy for new product development has received 
much attention in the economics and marketing literatures.  In any R&D project, two decisions 
are especially important: time to introduce the new product and product performance 
improvement.  Ideally, the new product should represent a major improvement in product quality 
over the existing one, and it should be introduced in a timely fashion.  However, given a fixed 
investment in the R&D project, the firm has to make a trade-off between time-to-market and 
quality improvement.  The firm can either expedite the product introduction at the expense of 
product performance or introduce a higher quality product by delaying the introduction time.  
One school of thoughts advocates the importance of time-to-market dimension.  A McKinsey 
study reports that, on average, a six-month delay in product shipment will cost companies 33% 
of after-tax profits.  Smith and Reinertsen (1991) argue for an incremental approach to product 
innovation because this will reduce the amount of time needed to develop the new product.  An 
alternative school of thoughts emphasizes the importance of product performance.  Zirger and 
Maidique (1990), based on a sample of new products in the electronics industry, show that 
product performance significantly affects product profitability.  Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1987) 
demonstrate that product superiority in terms of unique features, innovativeness, and 
performance, is a key factor that differentiates new product winners from losers.  Unfortunately, 
product quality improvement takes more time to develop and can significantly delay the product 
launch (see Griffin 1997 for empirical evidence).   
The firm’s R&D strategy is further complicated by competition.  Most new product 
development projects take place in a competitive environment, which makes the trade-off 
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between time-to-market and quality improvement even more difficult for the firm.  The 
consequence of being second to the market in a technology race may be a permanent 
disadvantage to the market leader.  On the other hand, rushing to the market with an immature 
technology can lead to disaster, for the pioneer can be easily overtaken by the second mover’s 
superior technology.  The existing research has produced mixed and often ambiguous findings.  
Kamien and Schwartz (1972) find that competition will cause the firm to postpone its R&D 
project indefinitely.  Ali, Kalwani, and Kovenock (1993) show that the competing firms may 
choose the same or different R&D projects (either incremental or drastic) depending on the profit 
rates that will accrue to new products.  However, they do not consider the time-to-market 
dimension endogenously, thus avoiding the issue of trade-off.  Cohen, Eliashberg, and Ho (1996) 
explicitly consider the trade-off and show that the optimal time-to-market and product 
performance target depend on parameters relating to the firm’s cost structure and market 
characteristics.  However, competition is exogenous in their model.  Bayus, Jain and Rao (1997) 
have developed a game theoretical model that explicitly considers quality improvement and 
time-to-market in a competitive environment and find that the leader prefers to introduce a 
higher-performance product at an earlier time than the follower.  In other words, the leader will 
invest more in its R&D project to avoid the trade-off.  However, Bayus, Jain and Rao 
exogenously determine the firms’ status as leader and follower, hence, the important issue of 
time-to-market in a technology race is essentially avoided in their model. 
In the studies that consider competition explicitly, the competing firms are often assumed 
to start their respective R&D projects simultaneously at time zero (e.g., Ali, Kalwani, and 
Kovenock 1993; Bayus, Jain and Rao 1997).  However, in the real world, symmetry is often the 
exception rather than the norm.  For example, Charles Schwab & Co. is the first retail investment 
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firm that offered online investment services.  Recognizing the potential of this new investment 
channel, Fidelity competed with Charles Schwab to develop software for its retail-brokerage 
customers to use in making investments online. As reported in BusinessWeek:
 1   
When Fidelity began the software-development effort, says CIO Albert Aiello, “we knew 
Schwab was coming out with something, and we wanted to jump right over them. We tried to do 
too much.” Aiello won’t disclose how much was spent on the project, but only 40,000 Fidelity 
brokerage clients---out of 1.6 million---use it today. 
While Fidelity stumbled, Schwab expanded its lead, signing up several hundred thousand 
customers to its proprietary software. Last May, Schwab widened the gap by launching Internet-
based equity trading.  Today, 24% of all trades executed by the San Francisco giant are done 
through its PC software. Fidelity plans to launch Internet trading by the end of the year.
  
Microsoft faced a similar problem when it tried to catch up with Netscape in the category 
of Internet browsing software.  Netscape was the innovator with its Navigator software for Web 
browsing.  In a frantic race with the market leader, Microsoft released four successive versions 
of Explorer in a little more than a year in 1997.  However, its market share was still far behind 
Netscape’s estimated 80%.
2  Microsoft’s Explorer did not gain significant market share until it 
was much improved in performance at a much later date.
3  Therefore, R&D competition between 
a market incumbent and a potential entrant represents a more realistic picture than that between 
two symmetric firms.  In this paper, we study just such a situation. 
Research on competition between a incumbent and an entrant does not yield clear 
findings.  One school of thoughts suggests that the incumbent, being the leader in the 
                                                 
1 October 28, 1996, p. 134. 
2 Reported in New York Times, March 10, 1997. 
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marketplace, tends to be more conservative in its new product effort.  A common perception in 
the field is that incumbent firms rarely introduce radical product innovations.  Such firms tend to 
solidify their market positions with relatively incremental innovations (Christensen 1997; 
Ghemawat 1991; Henderson 1993).  Reinganum (1983) shows that the incumbent invests less 
than the entrant in R&D because the incumbent, already having an innovative product, has less 
to gain from product improvement.  However, Gilbert and Newbery (1982) show the opposite 
finding: the incumbent will invest more in R&D to pre-empt the entrant.  In both papers, the 
authors exogenize quality improvement through patents; hence, the trade-off between quality 
improvement and time-to-market is not considered.  In an empirical investigation, Chandy and 
Tellis (2000) find that, in recently years, incumbents are more likely to introduce radical 
innovations than non-incumbents.  Furthermore, the innovations introduced by incumbents are 
no less radical than those introduced by non-incumbents. 
In this paper, we set up a game theoretical model in which an incumbent and an entrant 
choose their respective R&D strategies to compete with each other.  Our paper contributes to 
three major debates regarding a firm’s R&D strategy: the incumbent’s and the entrant’s choices 
between a radical R&D project and an incremental one, the incumbent’s decision of whether to 
pre-empt the entrant, and the trade-off between product quality improvement and time-to-market.  
Our model considers three decisions that both the entrant and the incumbent need to make: (1) 
the amount of investment in the R&D project, (2) timing of new product introduction, and (3) the 
magnitude of performance improvement.  These three decisions completely define a firm’s R&D 
strategy.  As for the product performance improvement, the entrant has to decide whether to 
introduce an incrementally improved product or a drastically improved one.  With the 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 For a detailed analysis of the browser war between Microsoft and Netscape, see Windrum (2001). 
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incrementally improved product, the entrant can enter the market earlier at a low R&D cost, but 
it will lag behind the incumbent in product performance.  On the other hand, with the drastically 
improved product, the entrant may be able to leapfrog the incumbent in product performance, but 
the downside is that the entry needs to be delayed or more investment in the R&D project is 
needed.  The entrant’s strategy is further affected by the incumbent’s potential reaction.  The 
incumbent, anticipating the entrant’s entry, can react by either improve its product incrementally 
or drastically.  The incumbent can even pre-empt the entrant’s entry by introducing its new 
product before the entry occurs. 
In many a case, the incumbent is fully aware of the entrant’s intention to enter the market 
so it can react to the entry even before it occurs.  For example, Netscape had been fully aware 
that Microsoft was developing an Internet browser software program to compete in the browser 
market.  In this case, the entrant is under greater pressure to rush to the market and/or to improve 
its product quality drastically.  In other cases, the incumbent is not aware of the existence of the 
entrant and it will be caught off guard when the entry occurs.  If this is true, how should a stealth 
entrant change its entry strategy?  Should it delay its entry time and/or introduce an 
incrementally improved new product? 
In addition to the fact that we consider competition explicitly in a game theoretical 
approach, unlike, say, Kamien and Schwartz (1972) and Cohen, Eliashberg, and Ho (1996), one 
major difference between our paper and the R&D literature is that our paper considers a 
complete R&D strategy, i.e., we consider all three decisions—R&D investment, time-to-market, 
and quality improvement, simultaneously and endogenously.  In contrast, many of the existing 
studies only consider two of the three decision variables mentioned above.  For example, Kamien 
and Schwartz (1972), Reinganum (1985), and Fethke and Birch (1982) consider both the timing 
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and the cost of R&D activities, but ignore performance improvement.  Rao and Rutenberg (1979) 
consider a firm’s timing of building a plant when competing with a rival.  Dasgupta and Stiglitz 
(1980) consider the cost of R&D activities and associated performance improvement in the form 
of marginal cost reduction (rather than of quality improvements considered in our model,) but 
they do not deal with the timing of new product introduction.  Another critical difference 
between our model and the existing literature is that, in our model, all three decision variables 
are determined jointly as a best response to the other firm’s strategies, that is, they are all 
endogenous in the game.  In particular, the R&D cost is endogenized in the model.  In contrast, 
most research treats one or two of the three decision variables exogenously, with the timing of 
introduction most frequently assumed to be exogenously determined in the form of probability 
distributions (Reinganum 1985, Kamien and Schwartz 1972, and Ali, Kalwani and Kovenock 
1993 use exponential distributions, and Fethke and Birch 1982 use a distribution with increasing 
hazard rate.)  Although the time needed to complete certain R&D projects such as the discovery 
of a new drug may indeed be random, many other R&D projects, especially those in high-tech 
industries, have very definite completion dates that are under the firms’ control.  Indeed, high-
tech firms are often able to pre-announce the introduction time of new products.  For example, 
Microsoft announced the introduction date for its Windows 95 operating system long before the 
actual launch.  The existing literature also often treats the cost of an R&D project as an 
exogenous variable, (Ali, Kalwani and Kovenock 1993 and Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980).  These 
assumptions, although mathematically convenient, avoid the strategic issue of the trade-off 
between time-to-market and product quality improvement under certain budget constraint.   
We find that, when trading off time-to-market against quality improvement, both the 
incumbent and the entrant should emphasize quality improvement over time-to-market.  
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Specifically, the entrant should enter the market with a drastically improved new product, even if 
it means that the entry has to be delayed.  The incumbent, anticipating the entrant’s move, should 
react by introducing a drastically improved new product as well.  Therefore, in the debate about 
the relative importance of time-to-market and quality improvement, we side with the school of 
thoughts that emphasizes the latter.  Furthermore, we find that there is no need for the incumbent 
to pre-empt the entrant’s move, i.e., the incumbent should introduce its new product only after 
entry even if it is certain about entry at the very beginning.  This is different from Gilbert and 
Newbery’s (1982) finding that the incumbent should pre-empt the entrant, and it is also different 
from Kamien and Schwartz (1972) who show that the incumbent will delay its R&D indefinitely 
in the face of competition.  As for the incumbent’s and the entrant’s choices of either a radical 
innovation or an incremental one, our finding is consistent with the conventional wisdom that the 
entrant should introduce a radically innovative product (Day and Shoemaker 2000).  However, 
our findings on the incumbent’s choice of R&D project differ from many existing studies that 
advocate a cautious approach (e.g., Reinganum 1983).  In recent years, many leading companies 
in various industries have come to the same conclusion and began to invest in more drastic R&D 
projects (see Chandy and Tellis 2000), as advocated by our findings.  Our findings are also 
different from other studies in that we have produced clear and easy-to-understand findings.  In 
contrast, many existing studies (e.g., Ali, Kalwani and Kovenock 1993; Cohen, Eliashberg, and 
Ho 1996; Bayus, Jain and Rao 1997) provide more nuanced but also ambiguous results that 
depend on market conditions that are difficult to empirically validate.   
The intuition for our major finding that both the incumbent and the entrant should engage 
in radical R&D projects is relatively straightforward.  Consider the entrant first.  If the entrant 
enters the market with an incrementally improved product, such an entry is not forceful enough 
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to challenge the incumbent’s dominant position; hence, it is a dominated strategy by a drastic 
R&D project.  And knowing that the entrant’s product will be always drastically improved, the 
incumbent should react likewise to protect its leadership position.  The optimal entry time for the 
entrant and the reaction time for the incumbent are determined according to the trade-off of R&D 
costs and firm profits, and in equilibrium, the incumbent will not pre-empt entry to minimize its 
R&D costs.  We also study the scenario where the incumbent does not anticipate the entry.  In 
this case, in order to take advantage of the incumbent’s delayed reaction, the entrant should 
accelerate its entry but should not change its product strategy, that is, it should still introduce a 
drastically improved new product.  Although being caught off guard by the entrant’s surprise 
entry, the incumbent should not react hastily.  Rather, it should proceed with the same pace in its 
R&D process as in the previous case and introduce a drastically improved new product. 
Our finding suggests that Microsoft, when attempting to enter the Internet browser 
market, should invest a substantial amount of resources to develop a new product that can 
surpass Netscape Communications in product performance, even if this means that Microsoft 
would have to delay the introduction of such a product.  Ironically, Microsoft adopted the 
strategy suggested by our model when it introduced Windows 95 operating system and 
Windows-based spreadsheet software Excel, that is, both were introduced with great 
improvement but at a much delayed time.  These two products have achieved great success in the 
marketplace. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  We describe the model and necessary 
assumptions in Section 2.  Section 3 analyzes the entrant’s and the incumbent’s R&D strategies 
in equilibrium when the entrant’s existence is known and Section 4 analyzes the same problem 
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when its existence is not known.  We consider the close-loop solution in Section 5 and discuss 
the results and conclude in Section 5. 
2. The  Model 
The market is currently occupied by a monopolist firm, called the incumbent.  An entrant 
is considering whether to enter the market or not.  To enter the market, it has to first develop a 
product by undertaking an R&D project.  The incumbent’s reaction to the entry involves 
developing its own new product by undertaking an R&D project.  We consider two scenarios in 
this paper.  First, the incumbent is aware of the entrant’s existence and its intention to enter the 
market.  In this case, the incumbent can start its R&D project even before the entry occurs.  We 
call this the simultaneous game because the entrant and the incumbent begin their respective 
R&D projects roughly at the same time.  This strategy is similar in spirit to the incumbent’s 
strategy of preparing R&D projects as contingency plans to react to potential entries.  IBM used 
such a strategy when competing for better disk drives.  The second scenario deals with an 
incumbent who is ignorant of the existence of the entrant.  In this case, the incumbent will not 
react to the entry by undertaking an R&D project until it actually occurs.  We call this the 
sequential game. 
We use an infinite time horizon instead of imposing an arbitrary fixed time window (e.g., 
Cohen, Eliashberg, and Ho 1996; Wilson and Norton 1989).  And the two firms’ strategies  
depend on two relationships: the relationship between R&D investment and product 
performance/time-to-market, and the relationship between product performance and profits. 
2.1. R&D  Investments 
The amount of R&D investment will determine product performance and the timing of 
introduction.  With a fixed amount of investment in R&D, the entrant can either expedite the 
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product introduction at the expense of product performance or introduce a higher quality product 
by delaying the introduction time.  A larger investment is needed if both a better product and an 
earlier introduction are desired.  The model assumes that the R&D investment is irreversible. 
First, the R&D cost is increasing in quality improvement.  A radically improved product 
is more costly to develop than an incrementally improved one because the former requires more 
financial and human resources.  Second, R&D cost savings can be achieved by delaying 
introduction for two reasons.  The first is the time value of money (opportunity cost).  The larger 
the discount factor, the greater the possible savings will accrue when the completion date is 
postponed.  The second is the inverse time-cost trade-off studied by Scherer (1967).  Time 
compression of the R&D project requires hiring more technicians and engineers and/or using 
more state-of-the-art equipment.  Hence, following Kamiem and Schwartz (1972), we use 
optimal control theory to develop the firm’s R&D investment.
4 
Suppose a firm’s existing product has a quality level of v0.  It intends to improve its 
quality to v' by time T, vv '> 0.  Let  () yt denote the effort exerted at time t.  Then, to improve 
quality by  () ∆vv v ≡− ' 0  by time T, it is necessary that the cumulative effort should achieve this 
goal, that is,  ()
0
T
y t dt v =∆ ∫ .  The cost of effort is assumed to be increasing and convex in the 
effort level.  Specifically, it is postulated that the cost of effort is  () () ct y t =
2 .  The firm’s 
                                                 
4 The key difference between our setup and Kamien and Schwartz’s is that we explicitly consider quality 
improvement.  In the literature, R&D investment is determined by several ways.  In Gilbert and Newbery (1982), the 
R&D investment equals the entrant’s discounted profit due to free entry, which reduces the entry’s net profit to zero.  
Reinganum (1983) uses a constant R&D investment rate.  Cohen, Eliashberg, and Ho (1996) assume that the total 
R&D investment is a function of development team size and wage rate.  Bayus, Jain, and Rao (1997) use a 
additively separable functional form in time-to-market and quality improvement.   
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(See Appendix A for proof).  Substituting the above result into (1), we find that the total R&D 
cost is  
  () Cv T
e




2.               (2) 
Clearly, with a fixed amount of capital available for product development, there are many 
different feasible combinations of ∆v  and T. 
We assume that neither the entrant nor the incumbent can alter its R&D project upon 
observing the new product introduced by the opponent.  It must continue with its chosen R&D 
project.  Essentially, we search for an open-loop solution, which is the standard model 
assumption used in the literature (Reinganum 1981, Ali, Kalwani, and Kovenock 1993, Bayus, 
Jain, and Rao 1997).  This assumption can be justified on the basis that switching to a different 
R&D project is prohibitively costly.  We believe that open-loop policies are a close 
approximation of most R&D projects because of the long and involved nature of the new product 
development process.   
Next, we characterize the firms’ profit functions. 
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2.2. Profit  Function 
We start by considering the entrant’s and the incumbent’s profit after entry occurs.  Each 
firm’s profit depends on its own and the competing firm’s product qualities.  Denote the 
incumbent’s quality by q1 and the entrant’s by q2.  We postulate that the firm’s profit rate at 
any time is given by  
  () π qq
q
qq
ij i j ij
i
ij
|, , , , , =
+
=≠    and  12 .             (3) 
An exogenously determined profit rate that depends on the product qualities such as (3) is used 
widely in the literature.  For example, Ali, Kalwani and Kvenock (1993) and Reinganum (1983) 
simply use a constant profit rate, which is independent of the competing firm’s product quality.  
In Kamien and Schwartz (1972), the profit rate is also exogenous, but it decays over time.  In 
Bayus, Jain, and Rao (1997), the profit rate is a general function of both firms’ product qualities.  
Hence, (3) can be viewed as a special functional form.  Cohen, Eliashberg, and Ho (1996) use a 
functional form that is identical to (3).  Actually, as shown in Cohen, Eliashberg, and Ho, (3) is a 
reduced functional form based on a demand function characterized by the logit model and 
constant profit margins for the two firms.
5  In many high-tech industries such as personal 
computers, firms essentially compete for market share while the profit margins remain constant 
more or less with ever-improved products.  For example, prices for personal computers have 
                                                 
5 Specifically, after entry, consumers choose between two products whose qualities are q1 and q2, respectively.  
According to the logit model, demand rate for product one is 
()
() () 2 1
1






= , where U(q) is the deterministic 







= .  Then, normalizing the 
constant profit margin to 1, we get (3). 
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ranged around $2000 for over a decade, be it 386-based computers or Pentium-IV-based ones.  It 
is clear from Figure 1, which illustrates gross profit margins for five major high-technology 
firms in recent years,
6 that their gross profit margins fluctuate within a narrow range over a long 
period of time.  It should be noted that (3) is each firm’s share of the total profit, and this 
normalization does not have any impact on our results.  In particular, before entry, the 
incumbent’s profit rate is normalized to 1 without any loss of generality.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
Suppose the incumbent is endowed with quality q before entry.  The entrant’s entry 
strategy consists of developing a product of quality θ2q to be introduced at time t2.
7  At the same 
time, anticipating entry, the incumbent decides to develop a new product whose performance is 
improved by θ1q and will be introduced at t1 to replace the existing product.
8  Then the 
incumbent’s new product’s quality is (1+θ1)q.  The incumbent can also choose not to react to 
entry, as indicated by θ1=0.  Then its product quality remains q.  Analogously, θ2=0 means no 
entry.  Without loss of generality, we make the normalizing assumption of q=1.
9  The entrant’s 
and the incumbent’s R&D investments are completely determined by  {} 2 2 2 ,t S θ =  and 
{} 1 1 1 ,t S θ = , respectively.   
                                                 
6 Data source: annual reports of the selected companies. 
7 Throughout the paper, the entrant’s variables are indexed by 2 and the incumbent’s by 1. 
8 In this paper, we do not consider the case where the incumbent’s old and new products coexist with each other.  
Empirical evidence suggests that products of different generations usually do not coexist in most high technology 
industries. 
9 If q is normalized to 0, it is equivalent to R&D competition between two symmetric entrants, a scenario studied by 
Ali, Kalwani, and Kovenock (1993) and Bayus, Jain, and Rao (1997).  However, as discussed earlier, this is not an 
interesting and realistic scenario. 
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Since our focus in this paper is the trade-off between time-to-market and product 
improvement, we want to highlight the firm’s strategic choice between a radical innovation and 
an incremental one.  To this end, we discretize the choice of R&D projects for both firms by 
assuming that  {} θθ 12 00 ,, , , ∈< < ID I D , where I is the quality improvement associated with an 
incremental R&D project and D a drastic one.
10  It is important to note that a drastic R&D 
project is drastic only in the sense that its quality improvement is greater than an incremental 
one.  It is not drastic in the sense that it will result in a new generation of technology such as 
digital camera as compared to traditional SLR camera.  In the latter case, the profit function 
might well very be different from (3).  Discretization of qualities is routinely used in the 
literature (for example, Ali, Kalwani, and Kovenock 1993 consider a truly innovative R&D 
project and a product modification project, analogous to a drastic R&D project and an 
incremental R&D project in our model.)  Through comparative static analysis, we can examine a 
continuous range of I and D and its impact on our findings. 
3.  The Simultaneous Game 
In this game, the incumbent and the entrant start their respective R&D projects 
simultaneously.  The simultaneity captures the feature that the incumbent anticipates the 
entrant’s move and start to prepare its reaction even before entry occurs.  The two firms’ 
discounted profits over an infinite time horizon depend on each other’s R&D strategies.  Given 
four possibilities in their choices of R&D projects and whether the incumbent pre-empts the 
entrant or not, we need to consider eight scenarios.  Consider the following scenario as an 
                                                 
10 If we allow a continuous range of product quality, it is hard to interpret the optimal choice of product quality as 
incremental, moderate, or drastic.  Then, we are unable to provide clear insights for the firms to resolve the trade-
off.  Similarly, we can also dichotomize the firms’ choice of introduction time.  Although this will significantly 
simplify the equilibrium analysis of the game, it will greatly compromise the external validity of our model.  
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example: the entrant decides to introduce a drastically improved product at time t2 and the 
incumbent decides to pre-empt the entrant by introducing an incrementally improved product at 
time t1, that is, the incumbent’s and the entrant’s strategies are  {} SI t 11 = ,  and  {} SD t 22 = ,,  
respectively, with tt 12 ≤ .  This scenario is depicted in Figure 2.  In this scenario, the 
incumbent’s product quality is 1 before t1 and is increased to 1+I after t1.  At time t2 (>t1), the 
entrant enters the market with a product of quality D.  After entry, the entrant earns a profit rate 
of  () I D + 1 | π , hence its discounted profit, given the incumbent’s strategy  {} SI t 11 = , , is  
{} { } () ( ) ( ) ∫
∞ − ≤ − + = Π
2
2 1 2 1 2 2    , , 1 | , | ,
t
t t t t D C dt e I D t I t D
δ π . 
For the incumbent, we need to consider three time intervals to calculate its discounted profit: [0, 
t1), [t1, t2), [ t2, ∞), corresponding to before pre-emption, between pre-emption and entry, and 
after entry.  Its profit rates in the three intervals are π(1|0), π (1+I|0), and π (1+I|D), respectively; 
hence we can obtain the incumbent’s discounted profit as   
{} { } () () ( ) ( ) () Π11 2
0









t ,|, | | | ,, . =+ + + + − ≤ ∫∫ ∫
−− ∞ − ππ π
δδδ   
For both firms, profit rate and R&D cost are given by (3) and (2), respectively. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
The two firms’ discounted profits under other scenarios can be similarly obtained and, 
after simplification, are summarized in Table 1 for the incumbent and in Table 2 for the entrant. 
[Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
To proceed with the equilibrium analysis, we need to impose certain regularity conditions 
on parameters I, D, and δ to restrict the analysis only to interesting cases.  A major difference 
between an incremental R&D project and a drastic one is that the latter allows the entrant a 
19 Zhao: R&D Competition Between an Incumbent and an Entrant
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012  16 
chance to leapfrog the incumbent in product quality whereas the former does not.  Hence, we 
require that I≤1 and D>1, (note that the incumbent’s endowed product quality is normalized to 
1).  We further strengthen the condition on D to allow the entrant to leapfrog the incumbent if the 
incumbent does not react or reacts with only an incrementally improved new product.  Hence, we 
require DI >+ 1 .  Combining these conditions, we have  
  I≤1 and D>1+I. (4) 
This means that  [] 1 , 1 min − < D I .  We also impose a necessary condition in the baseline case that 
the entrant will enter the market with a drastically improved product if the incumbent does not 






21 1 DD D
. (5) 
Condition (5) simply says that the discount factor has to be small enough so that the entrant can 
earn a positive discounted profit over time in the most optimistic scenario of no reaction from the 
incumbent.  If (5) does not hold, the entrant will simply not enter the market regardless of the 
incumbent’s reaction.  We restrict our attention to the parameter space defined by regularity 
conditions (4) and (5).  Next, we consider the incumbent’s potential reactions first and the 
entrant’s second. 
3.1.  The incumbent’s potential reactions 
First, it is trivial to prove that no reaction is a dominated strategy for the incumbent.  
Thus, we only need to consider the incumbent’s reaction with either I or D.  
Reaction to the entrant’s incrementally improved product. Note that the incumbent never 
wants to preempt entry if it knows the exactly entry time because such a move will not improve 
its profitability due to the profit function (3) but will increase the R&D cost.  Therefore, in 
20 Review of Marketing Science Working Papers Vol. 2 [2002], No. 2, Article 3
http://www.bepress.com/roms/vol2/iss2/paper3  17 
reaction to the entrant’s strategy of {I, t2}, the incumbent’s R&D strategy is either {I, t1} or {D, 
t1}, t1>t2.  If the reaction is {I, t1}, according to Table 1, the incumbent’s discounted profit is 






























Then, the incumbent will maximize its discounted profit at  
 





, ln =− − + +
δ





, >  and at t2 otherwise.  Superscript () II ,  refers to the incumbent’s and the entrant’s 




,  is ensured to be positive due to (5).  Given that the incumbent 
chooses to react to the entry with an incrementally improved new product, the incumbent should 
introduce its new product at  () I I t
,
1  if the entrant enters early or introduce it at the same time when 
the entry occurs.  The intuition is straightforward.  If the entry occurs early, the strategy of 
rushing to the market in reaction will result in a large increase in R&D costs for the incumbent.  
If the entrant decides to enter at a later time, the incumbent can also delay its reaction to the 
exact time when the entry occurs.  Note that  () I I t
,
1  is independent of the entry time t2. 
If the incumbent decides to react with a drastically improved new product, according to 
Table 1, its discounted profit is  






























Hence, the incumbent will maximize its discounted profit at  
 
























,  to be positive, it is necessary that 
21 Zhao: R&D Competition Between an Incumbent and an Entrant











which is satisfied if I is not too small.  Obviously, when I is too small, the entrant’s new product 
does not pose a big threat to the incumbent, so {} Dt , 1  is an overreaction.  Combining these two 
scenarios, we have the following proposition (proved in Appendix C): 
Proposition 1. In response to the entrant’s strategy {} It , 2 , the incumbent’s reaction should be: 
1.  If I is small enough, that is, if condition (8) is not satisfied, the incumbent should introduce 








, >  and at t2 otherwise. 
2.  If condition (8) is satisfied, the incumbent should introduce a drastically improved new 








, >  and at t2 otherwise.  
Reaction to the entrant’s drastically improved product. Parallel to the previous case, we can 
obtain the incumbent’s optimal introduction time by using appropriate profit functions in Table 
1.  Specifically, if the incumbent reacts by introducing an incrementally improved product, its 
discounted profit is maximized at  


















if  () tt
ID
12
, >  and at t2  otherwise.  If the incumbent reacts by introducing a drastically improved 
product, its discounted profit is maximized at  
 





, ln =− − + +
δ
δ , (9) 
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,  are positive because of the regularity 
condition (5).  Then, we can summarize the following result (proved in Appendix C): 
Proposition 2. In response to the entrant’s entry with a drastically improved product at t2 , the 









, >  and at t2  otherwise. 
3.2.  The entrant’s strategy 
When deciding whether to enter with an incrementally improved product or a drastically 
improved one, the entrant needs to anticipate the incumbent’s reaction.  Consider the incremental 
R&D strategy first. 
Entry with an incrementally improved product. In this case, suppose the incumbent reacts to 
the entry by introducing an incrementally improved new product at t1.  The entrant’s discounted 
profit depends on whether it is the first mover or not.  If it enters the market before the 
incumbent’s reaction, according to Table 2, its discounted profit is  






























Hence, the entrant will maximize its discounted profit at  





, ln =− − +
δ
δ , 
if  () tt st
II
21 1 ,
, ≤ .  The subscript 1st stands for the first mover.  If  () tt st
II
21 1 ,
, ≤  does not hold, the entrant 

























Hence, the entrant will maximize its discounted profit at  
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if  ( ) tt nd
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22 1 ,
, > . Both  ( ) t st
II
21 ,




,  are positive due to condition (5), and we can prove that 







, < . 
To completely determine the entrant’s introduction time, divide the incumbent’s reaction 
time into three intervals:  () [] 0 21 , ,
, t st
II , 







, , , and 
() () t nd
II
22 ,
, ,∞ .  In the first interval, the entrant 
does not want to be the first mover as the incumbent’s swift reaction does not make an early 




,  after the 
incumbent’s preemptive move.  In the third interval, the entrant wants to move ahead of the 
incumbent at  ( ) t st
II
21 ,
,  when the incumbent’s reaction is much delayed.  In the second interval, the 
entrant can be either the first mover or the second mover.  Comparing its profits with these two 
strategies, the entrant will move first if  

































and move second otherwise.  And it is easy to check that 




21 2 22 ,
,,
,
, <<.   
Now consider the incumbent’s reaction of introducing a drastically improved new 
product.  Similarly, we consider whether the entrant moves first or second.  By using appropriate 
profit functions in Table 2, we can derive the entrant’s optimal entry time.  Specifically, as a first 
mover, it should introduce its new product at the same time as in (I, I), i.e., 











, ≤ .  As a second mover, the entrant’s optimal entry time is  
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, . Obviously, 







, > .  Therefore, similar to the previous case, we divide the 
incumbent’s reaction time into three intervals and conclude that the entrant will move first if  
() () ( ) () ( ) [] tt
D















and move second otherwise.  Again, it is easy to check that 




21 2 22 ,
,,
,
, <<.  We 
summarize the results in the following proposition: 
Proposition 3. Suppose the entrant decides to introduce an incrementally improved product.  If 
the incumbent reacts with {} It , 1 , the optimal entry time is 
() tt nd
II
22 2 = ,




,  and 
() tt st
II






, .  If the incumbent reacts with {} Dt , 1 , the optimal entry time is 
() tt nd
DI
22 2 = ,




,  and at 
() tt st
DI
22 1 = ,





Entry with a drastically improved product. We have already established that the incumbent 
will always respond to such an entry by drastically improving its product (see Proposition 2), 
thus, we only need to analyze the entrant’s optimal entry time when facing a drastic reaction 
from the incumbent.  Parallel to the previous case, by using appropriate profit functions in Table 
2, we can derive the optimal entry time.  Specifically, if the entrant moves first, the optimal entry 
time is  
 





, ln =− − +
δ
δ . (10) 
If it moves second, the optimal entry time is  





, ln =− − +
δ
δ . 
25 Zhao: R&D Competition Between an Incumbent and an Entrant
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012  22 
Similar to the analysis of the previous two cases, the entrant will move first if 

































and move second otherwise.  Again, we have 




21 2 22 ,
,,
,
, <<.  The results are 
summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 4. Suppose the entrant decides to introduce a drastically improved product.  Since 




22 2 = ,




,  and 
() tt st
DD
22 1 = ,





3.3.  Strategies in equilibrium 
Given the entrant’s and the incumbent’s strategies described in Propositions 1 through 4, 
we now search for the Nash equilibrium in which each firm’s strategy is the best response to the 
other firm’s strategy.  There are three pure-strategy Nash equilibrium candidates: (I, I), () DI ,,  
and (D, D), where the first letter refers to the incumbent’s choice of R&D project and the second 
letter the entrant’s, each associated with certain introduction time.  () ID ,  is clearly not a Nash 
equilibrium according to Proposition 2.  
We start with (I, I).  This can be a Nash equilibrium only if I is sufficiently small, that is, 
if (8) is not satisfied.  To determine the entrant’s and the incumbent’s introduction time, we rely 
on Propositions 1 and 3 to superimpose the two firms’ reaction functions in Figure 3.  It is easy 
to prove that  () () tt
II II
12
,, >  for any I, resulting in the two reaction functions intersecting each other 
at point A in Figure 2.  This means that the two firms’ introduction times represented by point A 
are best responses to each other under (I, I).  Then, we can conclude that, with (I, I), the entrant 








, .  Next, consider () DI , .  If I is not too 
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small, namely, when (8) is satisfied, the incumbent will introduce a drastically improved new 
product in response to the entrant’s entry with an incrementally improved product, and the 








,  and the 








,, > , in equilibrium, the 




, , after the entrant enters 





[Figure 3 about here] 
With the entrant’s and the incumbent’s strategies completely defined in the three Nash 
equilibrium candidates, we can summarize their profits in Table 3.  This table will be useful in 
our search for Nash equilibrium. 
[Table 3 about here] 
We study each of the three equilibrium candidates to verify whether any of them is a 
Nash equilibrium.  For (I, I), consider the entrant’s incentive to deviate. Given the incumbent’s 
reaction  () {} It
II ,
,
1 , the entrant can deviate to a different introduction time or a drastically 
improved product at certain time.  Clearly, according to Proposition 3, deviation to a different 
introduction time will make the entrant worse off.  On the other hand, if the entrant deviates by 
introducing a drastically improved product, then by using its discounted profit under (I, D) given 




,  at  





, ln =− − + +
δ
δ , 
27 Zhao: R&D Competition Between an Incumbent and an Entrant
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012  24 
where the subscript dev stands for deviation, and its discounted profit in deviation is 

















ID is greater than the non-deviating profit shown in Table 3 (the 
first row under the heading, proved in Appendix D), we can conclude that (I, I) is not a Nash 
equilibrium.  This result is understandable because the entrant’s long-run profit rate with (I, I), 
which is I/(1+2I), is less than that if it deviates to D, which is D/(1+I+D). 
For (D, I), again, the entrant will not deviate to a different introduction time.  If the 




1 , by using the entrant’s 
discounted profit under (D, D) given in Table 2, we have 







,, >>, hence, the 










































Compare this profit with that in Table 3 (the second row under the heading), again, it is easy to 
prove that the entrant’s profit by deviating to D is greater than in () DI , , indicating that () DI ,  is 
not a Nash equilibrium. 
Lastly, for (D, D), as usual, the entrant has no incentive to deviate in introduction time.  If 
it deviates to I, given the incumbent’s reaction, its profit will be  
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by noting that 







,, >> .  Obviously, the entrant is worse off by deviating to I from 
D according to Table 3.  And Proposition ensures that the incumbent will not deviate in either 
introduction time or R&D project.  Since neither the entrant nor the incumbent will deviate from 
(D, D) , we conclude that (D, D) is a Nash equilibrium.  Combining all three Nash equilibrium 
candidates, we establish the following proposition: 
Proposition 5. There is a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategy in which the entrant will 




, , given by (10), and the 




, , given by 
(9). 
4.  The Sequential Game 
In this section, we study the situation where the incumbent does not anticipate the 
entrant’s move, either due to its ignorance of the entrant or its myopic behavior.  In this case, the 
entrant first enters the market, and then the incumbent, upon observing the entrant’s move, 
initiates an R&D project in reaction to the entry.  We use backward induction by analyzing the 
incumbent’s reaction first.  First, consider an entrant who introduces an incrementally improved 
product.   
Entry with an incrementally improved product. Suppose the entrant introduces an 
incrementally improved product at time T2.  At time T2, the incumbent can start its R&D project 
in reaction to the entry.  If the incumbent decides to complete its R&D project in time t1, it can 
introduce its new product at T1= T2+ t1.  Suppose the incumbent’s reaction is to introduce an 
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, , given by (6).  If the incumbent decides to 
react by introducing a drastically improved new product at T1= T2+ t1, its profit discounted back 































, , given by (7), if condition (8) is satisfied; 
otherwise the incumbent will not introduce a drastically improved new product.  Using the 
results in subsection 3.1, we can summarize the following lemma: 
Lemma 1. In reaction to the entrant’s strategy of {} IT , 2 , the incumbent will introduce a 
drastically improved new product at  () TTt
DI
12 1 =+
,  if condition (8) is satisfied, otherwise, it will 




, .  
Working backward, we can derive the entrant’s optimal entry strategy {} IT , 2 . 
Entry with a drastically improved product. According to Proposition 2, the incumbent will 
always react with the drastic R&D project, so we have  
                                                 
11 We do not discount the incumbent’s profit back to time 0 because its profit prior to T2 is not affected by its R&D 
strategy. 
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Lemma 2. In reaction to the entrant’s strategy of {} DT , 2 , the incumbent will introduce a 





Again, by working backward, we can derive the entrant’s optimal strategy {} DT , 2 . 
To determine the entrant’s strategy in equilibrium, we compare {} IT , 2  and {} DT , 2 and 
conclude that, (the proof is similar to that of Proposition 5): 
Proposition 6. In the sequential game where the entrant moves first and the incumbent starts its 
R&D project only upon observing the entry, there is a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategy 
in which the entrant will introduce a drastically improved product at 









































and the incumbent reacts by introducing a drastically improved new product at 
() () () TTt
DD DD DD
12 1
,, , =+ . 
We first note that, although the incumbent does not anticipate entry in the sequential 
game, this does not mean that the incumbent will panic and try to expedite its R&D project, as 
illustrated by the following corollary: 
Corollary 1. The actual time to complete the R&D project for the incumbent in the 




, , the same as in the simultaneous game. 
However, the entrant can take advantage of the incumbent’s ignorance.  Comparing with 
the simultaneous game, we can establish the following corollary: 
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Corollary 2. In the sequential game, the entrant will accelerate its entry to  () T
DD
2




,  because 
() () tT st
DD DD
21 2 ,
,, > .  Further, the entrant is better off and the incumbent is worse off 
in the sequential game than in the simultaneous game. 
The above result can be understood by considering the entrant’s profit rates.  The entrant 
enjoys a profit rate of  () DD /1 +  before the incumbent can react to its entry and a reduced profit 
rate of  () DD /1 2 +  after the incumbent’s reaction.  In the simultaneous game, the entrant enjoys 












, .  Thus, with a longer period of time to enjoy the higher profit rate and because the future 
profit is discounted, it is more advantageous for the entrant to accelerate its entry in the 
sequential game, resulting in an overall increased profit. 
5.  Discussions and Conclusions 
This paper studies the entrant’s and the incumbent’s R&D strategies in a setting of 
rivalrous competition.  The focus of our inquiry was on three decisions that consist of a firm’s 
R&D strategy: investment in an R&D project, product performance improvement, and the 
introduction time.  Our analysis recognizes that (i) these three decisions need to be made jointly, 
and (ii) that they need to be made by taking into account the competitor’s similar decisions. 
The key finding of the model is that, when entering a market, regardless of whether the 
incumbent anticipates its entry intention or not, the entrant should always introduce a product 
that will leapfrog the incumbent’s current product in performance, even if this means that it will 
cost more to develop such a product and the introduction has to be delayed.  When it is aware of 
the entrant’s intention to enter the market, the incumbent, in response to the entrant’s strategy, 
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should develop a new product whose performance is drastically improved from the existing 
product.  Incremental improvement contributes little to shield the incumbent’s leadership 
position from the entrant’ threats, and it is not sufficient for the entrant to challenge the 
incumbent’s position.  Returning to the example of Microsoft, the company, in its race with 
Netscape Communications in the market of Internet browsers, did not achieve much success as 
measured by market share by releasing four successive versions of Internet Explorer in little 
more than a year.  Microsoft would have been able to save R&D costs and achieve better results 
had it invested in just one much improved version, perhaps at the expense of a delayed 
introduction.  Note that this is the strategy Microsoft adopted when introducing Windows 95 
operating system with much success. 
The model also shows that it is not necessary for the incumbent to preempt the entrant’s 
entry by releasing its next generation product ahead of entry.  This is essentially a trade-off 
between prompt reaction to entry and the cost of accelerating new product introduction.  Rushing 
to the market, particularly with a drastically improved product proves to be too costly for the 
incumbent. 
When the incumbent is not aware of the entrant’s existence, it cannot start its R&D 
project in reaction to the entry until the entry occurs.  In this case, the entrant’s strategy will be 
different. Since it will take longer for the incumbent to introduce a new product in reaction to the 
entry, the entrant can enjoy the higher profit rate for a longer period of time.  Thus, the entrant 
should expedite its R&D project so it can enter the market earlier.  The incumbent, although 
caught off guard due to its failure to anticipate the entry, should not move too hastily in reaction 
to the entry.  Rather, it should proceed with its R&D project at the same rate as in the 
simultaneous game.  This result is consistent in spirit with the entrant’s strategy in that one 
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should always take time to improve the product drastically rather than rushing to the market 
prematurely.  This finding is consistent with Bayus, Jain, and Rao (1997) in their conclusion that 
Apple Computer’s Newton is “too little, too early.”
12 
Our findings contribute to three major debates regarding a firm’s R&D strategy: the 
incumbent’s choice between a radical R&D project and an incremental one, the incumbent’s 
decision of whether to pre-empt the entrant, and the trade-off between product quality 
improvement and time-to-market.  Our findings show that the incumbent should introduce a 
radically improved new product.  Furthermore, the entrant should adopt a similar R&D strategy.   
We also show that the incumbent should not pre-empt the entrant in the R&D race.  We further 
show that both the incumbent and the entrant should emphasize product quality improvement 
over time-to-market.    
Our model is most appropriate for those R&D situations where the firm has control over 
its R&D project in terms of completion time and product quality improvement.  Our model is not 
appropriate for situations where the successful completion of the R&D project at a pre-
determined time is uncertain such as the development of a drug.  It is also not appropriate for the 
winner-take-all situation due to either patent protection or other barriers.  Our model needs to be 
modified if there is a strong network externality effect (Dhebar and Oren 1985) on consumers’ 
choice behavior.  In this case, not only do consumers consider product quality when making 
choices, but also take into account the installed base of each technology and the compatibility of 
the two technologies because these factors will affect utilities consumers can derive from the 
                                                 
12 Actually, Apple’s R&D strategy with Newton was to rush to the market with a radical innovation, the handwriting 
recognition technology.  As shown in this paper, this strategy is clearly not optimal in the Nash equilibrium.  
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products.  An early entry may be more important than the product performance to the entrant in 
the presence of network externality effect, resulting in a Nash equilibrium different from () DD ,.  
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Appendix 
A. R&D cost minimization 
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Hence, the solution to problem (A1) is  
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B. Regularity Condition (5) 
If the entrant knows that the incumbent will not react to its entry, then its discounted 
profit with an incrementally improved product is 
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Note that (B1) is a necessary condition for the entrant to enter the market with a drastically 
improved product.  Even if (B1) holds, the entrant may still introduce an incrementally improved 
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C. The incumbent’s potential reactions 
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose (8) holds.  In reaction to the entrant’s{} It , 2 , the 
incumbent’s reactions and corresponding profits are summarized in Table C1.  With 
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which is true due to (8).  
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[Table C1 about here] 
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The above condition holds due to (8), confirming that the incumbent will choose {} Dt , 2 .  
Combining all three intervals, we show that the incumbent always prefers D to I for small I. 
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Proof of Proposition 2. The incumbent’s maximized profits in reaction to the entrant’s 
strategy of {} Dt , 2 are summarized in Table C2.  Similar to Proposition 1, we consider three 
intervals for t2 : 
() [] 0 1 ,
, t
ID , 
() ( ) ( ] tt
ID DD
11




, ,∞ . Following the proof of Proposition 1 
and using the incumbent’s profits in Table C2, we can prove that the incumbent will always 
choose D in reaction to the entrant’s strategy of {} Dt , 2 . 
[Table C2 about here] 
D. Entrant’s deviation from () II ,  
With the Nash equilibrium candidate () II , , if the entrant deviates to D, its profit is 













Note that () II ,  is a Nash equilibrium candidate only if  II < $ , where  $ I  is determined by (8).  
With  $ I  decreasing in D, we have III D <≤ = = $$ |. 1 0069.  Thus, I is a much smaller number than 
D. Hence, we have  
































and using the regularity condition (5), we have 
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Table 1 The Incumbent’s Profits under Different Scenarios 
R&D* Incumbent  pre-empts  entry  Incumbent does not pre-empt entry 















































































































































































* First letter indicates the incumbent’s choice of R&D project, and the second letter the entrant’s. 
Table 2 The Entrant’s Profits under Different Scenarios 
R&D*  Entrant moves first  Entrant moves second 




















































































































































































* First letter indicates the incumbent’s choice of R&D project, and the second letter the entrant’s. 
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Table 3 Two Firms’ Profits in Three Equilibrium Candidates 
R&D  Incumbent’s Profit  Entrant’s Profit 
() II ,   () ( ) ()
() ( )
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Table C1 The Incumbent’s Reactions to the Entrant’s Strategy of {I,t2} 
R&D  t2   Introduction Time  Incumbent’s Maximized Profit 
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Table C2 The Incumbent’s Reactions and Profits to the Entrant’s Strategy of {D,t2} 
R&D  t2   Introduction Time  Incumbent’s Maximized Profit 
() ID ,
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Figure 1 Gross Profit Margins for Selected High-Technology Firms 
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Figure 2 A Representative Scenario of Quality Improvement and New Production Times 
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Figure 3 Reaction Functions with (I, I) 
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